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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Increasing numbers of children are conceived through donor-assisted 
conception utilizing donated gametes, especially donated sperm.1  Despite 
the fact that using donated sperm is one of the most ancient forms of fertility 
treatment, it has traditionally been shrouded in secrecy, perhaps because it is 
used most commonly to redress problems of a husband’s infertility through 
the use of donated semen.2  However, the unabated advance of medical 
science (exemplified by the development of DNA testing) is altering the 
tradition of secrecy.3  The relative ease with which it is now possible to 
discover the identity of a person’s genetic parents, the open identification 
policy with regard to adoption, and the development of genetic testing for 
disorders have all dramatically influenced the development of human rights 
law in favor of the child’s right to know the truth about his or her genetic 
makeup.4  A growing body of research, largely conducted in the adoption 
field, supports the argument that knowledge of one’s genetic background is 
crucial to the development of a sense of identity or self.5  Despite the fact 
                                                                                                                   
 1 JANE FORTIN, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING LAW 470 (3d ed. 2009).  Egg 
donation is not as successful or as simple a process.  Additionally, the cost of donor 
conception utilizing donor eggs and the acute shortage of egg donors further complicate use of 
donated eggs.  Kamal K. Ahuja et al., Egg Sharing and Egg Donation: Attitudes of British 
Egg Donors and Recipients, 12 HUM. REPROD. 2845 (1997). 
 2 FORTIN, supra note 1, at 471.  The procedure itself dates to 1884, when the first donor 
insemination case was reported.  Eric Blyth, Donor Anonymity and Secrecy Versus Openness 
Concerning the Genetic Origins of the Offspring: International Perspectives, 2 JEWISH MED. 
ETHICS 4 (2006). 
 3 See Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith, Donor-Conceived People’s Access to Genetic and 
Biographical History: An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting 
Disclosure of Donor Identity, 23 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 174, 175 (2009) (discussing bans on 
donor anonymity).  Eleven developed, democratic countries have prohibited anonymous 
gamete donation and established systems to assist donor-conceived people, even children, 
identify their donors since 1985.  Id.  The jurisdictions include Austria, England, Finland, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Wales, and the Australian states of 
New South Wales, Victoria, and Western Australia.  Id. at 177.  Generally, access to 
identifying information is limited to offspring only.  Id.  Austria is the only country that 
allows children as young as fourteen to have access to this information.  Id. at 179.  Generally 
the age is sixteen or above, although some countries provide for exceptions in certain cases, 
such as when a donor-conceived child is born with a congenital disability.  Id. at 179–80. 
 4 Tabitha Freeman & Martin Richards, DNA Testing and Kinship: Paternity, Genealogy 
and the Search for the ‘Truth’ of Genetic Origins, in KINSHIP MATTERS 67, 75 (Fatemeh 
Ebtehaj et al. eds., 2006). 
 5 See, e.g., Katherine O’Donovan, Interpretations of Children’s Identity Rights, in 
REVISITING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 73, 75 (Deirdre Fottrell ed., 2000) (reporting on a study of 
Aboriginal children and the negative effects of policies that ignored their identity); see also 
Geraldine Hewitt, Missing Links: Identity Issues of Donor-Conceived People, J. FERTILITY 
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that the analogy of donor conception to adoption is somewhat controversial,6 
the use of rights-based arguments to endorse the position that children 
conceived by donor sperm should have access to identifying information 
about their gamete donor has gained credence and is now a commonly 
expressed argument.7   
The ability of donor-conceived children to access information about their 
genetic origins initially depends on their awareness of the nature of their 
conception.8  Without this knowledge, such children will assume that their 
“social” fathers are their genetic parents.9  Hence, the onus of revealing the 
manner of conception rests on the social parents, unless such information is 
disclosed by the state, such as through a birth certificate,10 or it is obvious 
that they cannot be the biological children of their social father.11  Concerns 
                                                                                                                   
COUNSELING, Autumn 2002, at 14, 19 (noting that “of the 47 donor-conceived people who 
took part in this study, only 3 had not experienced identity issues” and the other forty-four 
persons indicated that their identity issues related to “their conception through anonymous 
donor sperm”).  
 6 Ilke Turkmendag et al., The Removal of Donor Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of 
Claims by Would-Be Parents, 22 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 283, 286, 289 (2008). 
 7 Lucy Frith, Beneath the Rhetoric: The Role of Rights in the Practice of Non-Anonymous 
Gamete Donation, 15 BIOETHICS 473, 473 (2001). 
 8 See Rebecca Probert, Families, Assisted Reproduction and the Law, 16 CHILD & FAM. 
L.Q. 273, 287 (2004) (stating that a child’s right to know their origins only has meaning if the 
parents have a duty to disclose, and such a duty could be found in recording requirements like 
on a more “flexible” birth certificate updated throughout life that remains private until the 
child reaches the age of maturity). 
 9 A ‘social parent’ is “a genetically unrelated parent, but it can also refer . . . to a person 
who assumes the care and responsibilities usually associated with parenthood.”  Leanne 
Smith, Is Three a Crowd? Lesbian Mothers’ Perspective on Parental Status in Law, 18 CHILD. 
& FAM. L.Q. 231, 232 (2006).  Traditionally in England, relationships in a social family took 
precedence over biological ties.  Id. at 232–33.  Courts only consider interfering in presumed 
legitimacy in order to pursue the genetic truth about parenthood in cases where a marriage had 
already dissolved.  Id.  By contrast, the modern English judiciary has generally “become a 
champion for the cause of genetic [parenthood].”  Id. at 235. 
 10 The English government has not followed up on numerous suggested birth certificate 
changes that would alert donor-conceived children to their status and genetic parentage.  Blyth 
& Frith, supra note 3, at 185–86.  The Joint Committee in their recommendations on the draft 
Human Tissue and Embryos Bill expressed deep concern at this omission, commenting that 
the authorities “may be colluding in a deception.”  JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE HUMAN TISSUE 
AND EMBRYOS (DRAFT) BILL, HUMAN TISSUE AND EMBRYOS (DRAFT) BILL, VOLUME I REPORT, 
2006-7, H.L. 169-I, H.C. 630-I, para. 276 [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT].  
 11 Whilst acknowledging the importance of allowing donor-conceived children access to 
information about their genetic background, the English government argued that it was 
preferable to educate parents “about the benefits of telling children that they were donor-
conceived rather than forcing the issue through the annotation of birth certificates.”  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT FROM THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON THE HUMAN TISSUE AND EMBRYOS (DRAFT) BILL, 2007, Cm. 7209, para. 69 
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have been expressed about low levels of parental disclosure.12  A study 
conducted in 2002 indicated that as few as 5% of parents of donor-conceived 
children had told their near-adolescent children about their conception 
origins.13  Even that number may be high as reported disclosure rates are 
likely to be overestimated because some non-respondents do not participate 
due to privacy issues and fears of revealing their use of donor conception.14  
The low rate of disclosure may change as the United Nations Committee 
on the Rights of the Child puts increasing pressure on national systems that 
withhold information about the identities of biological fathers from children 
born by donor conception.15  Although legislative changes removing donor 
anonymity may play a part in facilitating parental disclosure,16 a parental 
decision not to reveal the truth to a donor-conceived child is a complex 
family matter and therefore very difficult to regulate by law.  Furthermore, in 
Europe, such intervention could arguably be construed as a violation of 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which 
guarantees the right to privacy and family life, inter alia, subject to justifiable 
state intervention.17 
                                                                                                                   
[hereinafter RESPONSE TO DRAFT BILL].  However, it has agreed to keep the issue under 
review.  Id. para. 70. 
 12 See Claes Gottlieb et al., Disclosure of Donor Insemination to the Child: The Impact of 
Swedish Legislation on Couples’ Attitudes, 15 HUM. REPROD. 2052, 2052 (2000) (noting that a 
majority of Swedish parents who utilized donor conception did not inform their children 
despite the fact that under the Swedish law children could not learn this except by parental 
disclosure); RICHARD J. BLAUWHOFF, FOUNDATIONAL FACTS, RELATIVE TRUTHS: A 
COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY ON CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO KNOW THEIR GENETIC ORIGINS 290–96, 
302–05 (2009) (discussing the position in France, Germany, and Portugal); see generally 
Ellen Waldman, What Do We Tell the Children?, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 517 (2006) (discussing 
the position in the United States). 
 13 Susan Golombok et al., Families with Children Conceived by Donor Insemination: A 
Follow Up at Age Twelve, 73 CHILD DEV. 952, 966 (2002) (noting that two out of thirty-seven 
children surveyed had been told their genetic origins).  An earlier study suggested that few 
(4%) planned to tell and a further 1% were undecided.  Gottlieb et al., supra note 12, at 2053. 
 14 See Gottlieb at al., supra note 12, at 2052, 2054 (noting that higher rates of revelation 
were likely in the group of parents that responded to the questionnaire and that prior to 
Swedish legislation in 1985 all donors were anonymous and unable to be traced, and the 
mother and nonbiological father were encouraged not to inform anyone about the donation). 
 15 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, paras. 31–32, 
CRC/C/15/Add.188 (Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: UK]. 
 16 E. Lycett et al., School-Aged Children of Donor Insemination: A Study of Parents’ 
Disclosure Patterns, 20 HUM. REPROD. 810, 811 (2005). 
 17 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
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This Article argues that, although the data regarding open adoption 
appears promising, policy makers should be wary of a wholesale transfer of 
the analogous lessons from adoption policy to the world of donor 
insemination.  Before embracing such a wholesale change in legal policies, 
this Article argues that there should be a careful assessment of the adoption 
analogy and examination of empirical evidence about children born through 
gamete donation in various countries.  In order to reach this conclusion, 
Part II of this Article examines international jurisprudence regarding donor 
anonymity.  Part III of this Article presents a comparative study of the policy 
regarding anonymous donation in France, Sweden, England, and the United 
States.  Part IV then presents arguments for nondisclosure of donors, whereas 
Part V discusses the arguments for disclosure.  Finally, Part VI recommends 
a nuanced approach to considering the varied interests and rights of all 
family members that gives adequate weight to the collective family interests 
and rights of all parties, including those of the would-be parents and sperm 
donor.18  
II.  INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS? 
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and the 
European Court of Human Rights are two of the international bodies 
concerned with producing guidelines and enforcing international laws 
regarding right to know one’s origins.  The United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of the Child is in charge of monitoring the enforcement of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),19 while the European 
Court of Human Rights is in charge of reviewing national decisions based on 
the ECHR.20  This Part of the Article focuses on the jurisprudence 
surrounding the interpretation of the CRC and the ECHR, and how those 
interpretations have influenced European developments. 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Cf. Elizabeth Siberry Chestney, Note, The Right to Know One’s Genetic Origin: Can, 
Should, or Must a State That Extends This Right to Adoptees Extend an Analogous Right to 
Children Conceived with Donor Gametes?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 365 (2001).  This article describes 
how recent Tennessee and Oregon statutes granting adoptees the right to know their genetic 
parents have withstood challenges under state and federal constitutions and questions whether 
a similar right should be granted to donor-conceived children by arguing that a child’s best-
interest analysis supports the right to discover the identity of their genitors.  Id. at 369–74.  
Chestney asserts that such statutes would withstand constitutional attack in the United States.  
Id. at 390. 
 19 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 43(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CRC]. 
 20 ECHR, supra note 17, art. 19.  
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A.  Interpretation of the CRC 
In 1989, the CRC was drafted as the first legally binding international 
instrument to incorporate the full range of human rights—civil, cultural, 
economic, political, and social—to protect children (defined as persons under 
the age of eighteen).21  By ratifying the CRC, States Parties commit 
themselves to protecting and ensuring children’s rights and developing 
actions and policies to promote the best interests of the child.  However, 
none of the articles in the CRC specifically promote a child’s right to 
knowledge of his or her origins.22 
The United Nations established the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
to monitor the rights granted by the CRC, but failed to provide the 
Committee with enforcement powers and, further, there is no mechanism for 
individual petition under the CRC.23 
Article 7 of the CRC states: 
1.  The child shall be registered immediately after birth and 
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a 
nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be 
cared for by his or her parents. 
 
2.  States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights 
in accordance with their national law and their obligations 
under the relevant international instruments in this field, in 
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.24   
                                                                                                                   
 21 See generally CRC, supra note 19.  The CRC sets out these rights in fifty-four articles 
and two optional protocols, which spell out the basic human rights that children should have—
the right: to survival; to develop to the fullest; to protection from harmful influences, abuse, 
and exploitation; and to participate fully in family, cultural, and social life, essential for the 
human dignity and harmonious development of every child.  Id.; Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 
G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (entered into force Feb. 12, 2002); Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (entered into 
force Jan. 18, 2002). 
 22 Douglas Hodgson, The International Legal Protection of the Child’s Right to a Legal 
Identity and the Problem of Statelessness, 7 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 255, 265 (1993). 
 23 Samantha Besson, Enforcing the Child’s Rights to Know Her Origins: Contrasting 
Approaches Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 137, 150 (2007). 
   24  CRC, supra note 19, art. 7. 
626  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:619 
 
The Committee has interpreted Article 7 as granting a child’s right to 
knowledge of his or her origins.25  Further, it has consistently criticized 
nations that do not allow for such a right or that allow mothers to give birth 
anonymously, as in France,26 and made recommendations to contracting 
States Parties regarding incomplete national enforcement of the child’s right 
to know his or her origins.27  However, national authorities have a degree of 
discretion, provided they do not give higher priority to parental rights than 
children’s rights and do not “diverge in their interpretations of the scope and 
degree of the duties imposed by [the CRC].”28 
In the context of the right to know, the reference to parents could indicate 
a right to know one’s biological parents since it is possible to interpret 
Article 7 broadly so that the term “parents” includes not only social or legal 
parents, but also biological and gestational parents.  Furthermore, if Article 7 
is read in the light of the rest of the CRC, in particular Articles 9 and 18, it 
would appear to guarantee the child’s right to have a relationship with her 
parents, but it is not entirely clear what the right to know and be cared for by 
one’s parents would entail.29  It might imply the right to contact them as well 
as knowledge of their identity.  On the one hand, it might be argued that 
there should be legislation imposing this obligation on family relationships, 
and that such an obligation should be based on a model of scientifically 
derived genetic truth.  On the other hand, it could be maintained that the right 
to know one’s origins is simply a fashionable notion fueled by advances in 
biomedical sciences.30  Clearly the biological model of parenthood cannot 
rank as highly as other types of parenthood, such as those arising from active 
caring, nurturing, and love.  Like the right to know, the right to be cared for 
                                                                                                                   
   25  Besson, supra note 23. 
   26  Id. at 153–54. 
 27 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child: Denmark, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.33 (Feb. 15, 1995) [hereinafter 
U.S. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Denmark]; U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Norway, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.23 (Apr. 25, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: 
Norway]; U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: UK, supra note 15. 
 28 Besson, supra note 23. 
 29 See CRC, supra note 19, arts. 9(3), 18 (demanding that states respect the right of children 
separated from one or more parents to maintain relationships with each and recognizing the 
common responsibilities of parents in child rearing). 
 30 See generally Carol Smart, Law and the Regulation of Family Secrets, 24 INT’L J.L. 
POL’Y & FAM. 397 (2010) (highlighting the potential negative effects stemming from 
knowledge of genetic origins). 
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by one’s biological parents, besides one’s social parents, is always qualified 
by the words “as far as possible.”31 
 Article 8 states:  
States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to 
preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and 
family relations as recognized by law without unlawful 
interference. . . . Where a child is illegally deprived of some or 
all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall 
provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to 
re-establishing speedily his or her identity.32 
Article 8 was originally proposed in order to deal with the abuses 
committed by the military regime in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s, 
which abducted infants from their mothers before their births had been 
registered and illegally gave them to couples associated with the armed 
forces and the police.33  However, during the drafting process of the CRC, 
many countries opposed Article 8’s emphasis on the child’s identity and its 
inconsistency with secret adoption and protecting the identity of gamete 
donors.34  As a result, a political compromise was reached.35  The provision 
was retained with the addition of a few provisos, such as “without unlawful 
interference,” “illegally,” or “as recognized by law.”36  “Lawful” is 
understood to encompass national as well as international legal norms, so 
that national legal restrictions will not be permitted to contradict 
international obligations.37 
Article 8 does not define the concept of identity.  Instead, it gives three 
examples of what identity includes: nationality, name, and family relations.38  
Knowledge of one’s family relations is usually interpreted as going beyond 
knowing one’s legal parents and extending to biological and birth parents.39  
                                                                                                                   
 31 CRC, supra note 19, art. 7. 
 32 Id. art. 8. 
 33 BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 52–53.   
 34 THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE 
“TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” 293 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992) [hereinafter A GUIDE TO THE 
“TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES”]. 
 35 See id. (noting deliberations between several countries regarding the language to be used 
in Article 8). 
 36 CRC, supra note 19, art. 8. 
 37 A GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES,” supra note 34. 
 38 CRC, supra note 19, art. 8. 
 39 Andrew Bainham presents a logical argument in favor of this approach.  See Andrew 
Bainham, Parentage, Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: Subtle, Elusive Yet Important 
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Article 8 implies duties to register and preserve data regarding a child’s 
identity and to make that data accessible to the child.40  It emphasizes 
positive duties of assistance by referring to states “undertaking to preserve” 
the child’s identity and calling for appropriate measures to reestablish the 
child’s identity.41  Another guiding principle may be found in Article 3 of the 
CRC, which makes the child’s best interest a primary consideration, 
imposing limits on the right to know in cases where the information would 
be blatantly contrary to the child’s best interests.42  The United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child appears to interpret the CRC as 
bestowing a clear right to donor-conceived children to knowledge of their 
genetic identity.43  However, no convincing research been done to indicate 
that the enforcement of such a right is as beneficial for donor-conceived 
children as it is for adopted children.44  Additionally, if children have a right 
to know their genetic origins, then from a Hohfeldian perspective, a 
corresponding duty should rest on the parent or the state to inform the 
child.45  That specific right appears to be lacking in the framework of the 
CRC.  
Neither Article 7 nor Article 8 settles the issue of which among the 
child’s interests should prevail in case of conflict between her interest to 
know her origins and her other interests.  Nor do they provide any criteria as 
to how to balance the child’s interests with those of others in case of conflict.  
Thus the provisions of the CRC relating explicitly to the child’s identity do 
not directly offer any protection to the child’s individual identity.46  
                                                                                                                   
Distinctions, in WHAT IS A PARENT? A SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS 25, 37–38 (Andrew Bainham 
et al. eds., 1999).  
 40 CRC, supra note 19, art. 8. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Article 3 of the CRC provides that the best interests of children must be the primary 
concern in making decisions that may affect children.  Id. art. 3.  All adults should do what is 
best for children.  When adults make decisions, they should think about how their decisions 
will affect children.  This particularly applies to budgetary, policy, and legal decisions. 
 43 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Denmark, supra note 27; U.N. Comm. on the 
Rights of the Child: Norway, supra note 27; U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child: UK, 
supra note 15. 
 44 See Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 290 (describing that most studies are in the 
context of adopted children and that the ones that are specific to donor offspring are 
methodologically flawed). 
 45 See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS 
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) 
(presenting Hohfeld’s perspective that every right should have a correlative duty, a 
perspective that has dominated much of the jurisprudential discussion of rights). 
 46 Ya’ir Ronen, Redefining the Child’s Right to Identity, 18 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 147, 
160 (2004). 
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Moreover, the preamble to the CRC appears to envisage a social family, 
which succors the inner psychological sense of well-being of a donor-
conceived child.47  It refers to the fact that countries that have ratified the 
CRC have accepted the obligations that the CRC imposes on states to take 
account of the significance of traditional and cultural family values “for the 
protection and harmonious development of the child.”48  The well-being of 
the child would thus appear to be the main object of the CRC, rather than a 
bald focus on the child’s right to identity, although the two concepts are 
clearly linked.  Furthermore, Article 20 states that, when children are 
deprived of their family environment, whether or not it be for their own best 
interest, “due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s 
upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic 
background.”49  Finally, Article 5 of the CRC states that “States Parties shall 
respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, 
the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local 
custom . . . to provide . . . appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise 
by the child of the rights recognized in the [CRC].”50  
Overall it would appear that, despite the interpretation of the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, the formulation of the CRC is 
in fact open-ended and can accommodate interpretations such as a child’s 
socio-legal parentage, religious, and cultural identities.  Other human rights 
documents in the United Nations framework and substantive provisions of 
the CRC further that interpretation.51  
                                                                                                                   
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. (quoting CRC, supra note 19, art. 18(2)). 
 49 CRC, supra note 19, art. 20.  Children who cannot be looked after by their own family 
have a right to special care and must be looked after properly, by people who respect their 
ethnic group, religion, culture, and language.  Id. 
 50 Id. art. 5.  Article 5 of the CRC provides that governments should respect the rights and 
responsibilities of families to direct and guide their children so that, as they grow, they learn 
to use their rights properly.  Helping children to understand their rights does not mean pushing 
them to make choices with consequences that they are too young to handle.  Article 5 
encourages parents to deal with rights issues “in a manner consistent with the evolving 
capacities of the child.”  Id.  The CRC does not take responsibility for children away from 
their parents and give more authority to governments.  It does, however, place on governments 
the responsibility to protect and assist families in fulfilling their essential role as nurturers of 
children.  Id. 
 51 BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 58; see also Council of Eur. Comm. of Experts on Family 
Law, Report on Principles Concerning the Establishment and Legal Consequences of Parentage 
– “The White Paper,” at 7 (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsettin 
g/family/CJ-FA_2006_4e%20Revised%20White%20Paper.pdf.  This White Paper “reflect[s] a 
balance between ‘the biological truth’, reflecting primarily biological and genetic parentage, and 
‘the social parenthood’, reflecting . . . with whom the child is living and who is taking care of 
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B.  The European Court of Human Rights: A Holistic Approach?  
It is arguable that the greater balance demonstrated in the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights correlates more closely to that of the 
original intention of the drafters of the CRC.  Both the European Court of 
Human Rights and the original drafters of the CRC recognized the 
importance of cultural and social inheritance and a stable family to a child.  
Article 8(2) of the ECHR expressly acknowledges the possibility that it may 
be necessary to restrict the right to know one’s origins when it conflicts with 
other rights and outlines the conditions and balancing guidelines that should 
be respected.52  The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
has also maintained that the right of a donor-conceived child to know his or 
her identity is not absolute.53  Arguably, a state’s positive duties resulting 
from the right to know one’s origins are best determined by national efforts 
to balance that right against the rights of other parties.54  This Court respects 
the state’s margin of appreciation when balancing rights55 and provides 
                                                                                                                   
him or her.”  Id.  The commentary specifically states that, in certain situations, the child’s best 
interests may justify withholding information regarding his or her origins.  Id. at 31.  The 
Council of Europe Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Progress in the Biomedical Sciences 
affirms that donor anonymity should be maintained more generally, but certain exceptions 
should permit the child access to donor information.  Council of Eur. Ad Hoc Comm. of Experts 
on Progress in the Biomedical Scis., Report on Human Artificial Procreation (1989) [hereinafter 
Report on Human Artificial Procreation], available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/healthbioethic/so 
urce/PMAprinciplesCAHBI1989_en.doc (affirming Principle 28 of the White Paper that donor 
anonymity should be maintained).  The health of the child is mentioned as a factor that could 
require a waiver of donor anonymity, but there is no indication of who should disclose the 
identifying information to the child in these circumstances.  Id. 
 52 Besson, supra note 23.  But cf. CRC, supra note 19, art. 8(2) (stating that “[w]here a 
child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties 
shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his 
or her identity,” and suggesting a narrower right to know). 
 53 Besson, supra note 23. 
 54 See Paul Mahoney, Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 
19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 3 (1998) (noting the inference that where there is a wide but legitimate 
range of opinion on a subject, the ECHR drafters intended a democratic resolution at the 
national level).  In particular, Mahoney points to the danger to democratic orders should the 
European Court of Human Rights allow persons to gain rights in Strasbourg via judicial 
interpretation that they have been unable to obtain democratically and legislatively in their 
own country.  Id.  
 55 Id.  Margin of appreciation implies that, “[b]y reason of their direct and continuous 
contact with . . . their countries, State authorities are . . . in a better position than the 
international judge[s] to give an opinion on the exact content of the[ ] requirements” of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, “as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or 
‘penalty’ intended to meet them.”  Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
para. 48 (1976).  “Where the law and practice differ widely among the Contracting States, 
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particularly broad determinative powers in matters pertaining to private life 
and identity when there is no consensus among state parties.56  Private life 
and the nature of the state’s obligation will depend on the particular aspect of 
private life that is at issue.57  For a long time, the court respected the national 
margin of appreciation in the case of violations of the right to know one’s 
origins.58 
In Nylund v. Finland, the European Court of Human Rights held that, 
since a mother and her husband believed a paternity test would disturb their 
family relationship, it was fully justifiable for the courts of Finland to give 
more weight to the interests of the child and the family unit than to the 
interests of the applicant’s father in establishing the biological truth of his 
paternity, even when he claimed that it was also in the child’s best interest.59  
The European Court of Human Rights suggested that after reaching the age 
                                                                                                                   
individual countries will, as a result, be afforded a wider margin of appreciation by the 
[European Court of Human Rights].”  Brian Tobin, Same-Sex Couples and the Law: Recent 
Developments in the British Isles, 23 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 309, 317 (2009).  However, the 
margin of appreciation should not be confused with the discretionary area, which is the 
freedom of action open to institutions such as Parliament from domestic courts.  Wade K. 
Wright, The Tide in Favour of Equality: Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and England and 
Wales, 20 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 249, 275 (2006). 
 56 Schalk v. Austria, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 46 (2010).  In Schalk v. Austria, the European 
Court of Human Rights acknowledged that there had been major social changes in the nature 
of marriage since the adoption of the ECHR, but held that there was still no consensus in the 
matter.  Id. para. 58.  Thus, the court refused to undertake a dynamic interpretation of the 
ECHR in the belief that it should not be hasty to substitute its own judgment for those of 
national states.  Id. para. 62.  See generally Masha Antokolskaia, Harmonisation of 
Substantive Family Law in Europe: Myths and Reality, 22 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 397 (2010) 
(noting the common background of European nations regarding family law, the current 
division on that issue, and the European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of the margin of 
appreciation in light of the presence or absence of consensus). 
 57 The margin focuses on the consensus that prevails in Convention signatory States and is 
not concerned with the position in an individual Convention State.  Nicholas Bamforth, “The 
Benefits of Marriage in All but Name?” Same-Sex Couples and the Civil Partnership Act 
2004, 19 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 133, 143 (2007). 
 58 This flexible approach was evident in Mikulic v. Croatia, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R.  In this 
case, the mother of a five-year-old girl claimed on her daughter’s behalf that the fact that her 
daughter had no means of forcing a putative father to submit himself to DNA testing violated 
her right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR since there was no independent authority 
to which she could submit her paternity claim.  Id. paras. 8, 47, 56, 64.  The European Court 
held that the right to private life should include the determination of the legal relationship 
between an extramarital child and her natural father.  Id. paras. 53–55.  Croatia needed to put 
in place procedures to allow her, without unnecessary delay, to obtain certain knowledge of 
her personal identity.  Id. paras. 64–65.  However, the Court stressed that in each case it is 
important to strike a balance, recognizing that the father also has a right to privacy that entitles 
him to avoid forced DNA testing.  Id. para. 65. 
 59 Nylund v. Finland, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (located under heading “The Law” pt. 2(a)). 
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of fifteen the child would be able to decide for herself whether or not she 
wished to institute paternity proceedings.60  The result of this case indicates 
that the European Court has, in the past, recognized that legal certainty and 
the continuity of a stable family unit may promote a child’s interests.  The 
court also expressed a measure of doubt about the necessity of establishing 
the biological truth where the child is very young and the search for paternity 
emanates from a third party.61 
The European Court of Human Rights has also rejected the claim that the 
absolute birth secrecy granted in some European countries, like France, 
violates Article 8 of the ECHR.62  In 2003, the French practice was 
challenged under Article 8 of the ECHR in the Odièvre decision.63  The court 
held that the possibility that the anonymously born claimant might be 
provided with non-identifying data, together with the provisions of the 2002 
legislation authorizing an independent council to waive confidentiality with 
the mother’s consent, were sufficient evidence of France’s efforts to seek a 
balance and to ensure proportional weighting of competing interests.64 
Dissenting judges in Odièvre regarded the right to know as having been 
entirely sidestepped.65  In Jäggi v. Switzerland, decided only three years after 
Odièvre, the court adopted the dissenting judges’ approach and emphasized 
the importance of the balancing of all rights without giving absolute priority 
to any of them.66  It would appear that the court would no longer decide 
Odièvre along the same lines today, and that French law will most likely 
have to be amended accordingly.67 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Id. 
 61 BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 71.  Note that Nylund seemed to forestall any further 
claims by presumptive genetic fathers.  Nylund, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (located under heading 
“The Law” pt. 2(a)). 
 62 Odièvre v. France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 3, 49. 
 63 Id.  In that case, Ms. Odièvre argued that the fact that her mother had been allowed to 
keep Ms. Odièvre’s biological identity from her via the French practice of anonymous birth 
infringed Article 8 of the ECHR.  Id. paras. 10, 24–25. 
 64 Id. para. 49. 
 65 Id. para. 7 (Wildhaber, J., dissenting).  According to the dissenting judges in the case, the 
margin of appreciation doctrine should not be regarded as exempting the Court from its duty 
to review the way in which the rights had been balanced.  Id. paras. 10–12 (Wildhaber, J., 
dissenting).  Moreover, the problem with the decision lay in the fact that French law, by 
giving absolute priority to the right of the mother, precludes any balancing of the interests at 
stake, resulting in a violation of the inner core of the child’s rights.  Id. paras. 11–12 
(Wildhaber, J., dissenting). 
 66 Jäggi v. Switzerland, 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30 (2006). 
 67 See BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 399 (noting that recent “admonishments . . . have 
prompted the French government to review its legislation on accouchement sous X [the right 
to anonymous birth]”). 
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A nuanced and sensitive approach is needed to balance the child’s 
interests and safeguard the child’s emotional well-being.  If knowledge of a 
child’s origins might destabilize the child’s family life, it is questionable 
which of the child’s interests takes precedence and must be protected.  To 
what extent will the interest of knowing one’s biological parents be 
protected?  No answer to this question is provided in the wording of the 
ECHR or offered by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights.  What is clear, however, is that neither the CRC nor the ECHR 
provide a legal framework that permits the assertion of an absolute, child-
constructed right to identity.68  
 III.  COMPARATIVE LAW POSITION: CONTRASTING APPROACHES 
This Part of the Article examines the law in various jurisdictions, 
particularly France, Sweden, England,69 and the United States and their 
varying approaches to the issue.  The vastly differing legal approaches in 
these countries are integrated into this Article’s arguments for and against 
mandatory disclosure and anonymous sperm donation.  France has been 
selected for examination because in that country the doctrine of anonymity is 
respected as an absolute necessity by the French medical profession in 
accordance with its general duty to maintain secrecy.70  By contrast, Sweden 
has been selected because it was the first nation to ban donor anonymity in 
light of its growing culture of openness.71  Passage of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) 
                                                                                                                   
 68 Ronen, supra note 46, at 167. 
 69 Prior to the 1980s, there was little information available about donor conception in 
England and no regulation or central recording of semen donations.  Turkmendag et al., supra 
note 6, at 285.  Until 1977 children born through donor insemination were considered 
illegitimate and would-be parents had to legally adopt the child.  Id.  Clinicians recommended 
parents tell the child that he or she was adopted rather than conceived through donor 
insemination.  Waldman, supra note 12, at 547.  The donor was the legal father rather than the 
mother’s husband, but the husband was often recorded as the father on the birth certificate, 
which was technically a crime.  Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 285.  Prior to the 
development of DNA testing to prove genetic parentage conclusively, scientific blood testing 
had limited ability fully to determine paternity.  Smart, supra note 30, at 398.  Even the 
availability of DNA tests hardly changed the situation since a mother could refuse permission 
for a blood sample to be taken from her child.  See, e.g., Re F (a Minor) (Blood Test: Parental 
Rights) [1993] Fam. 314 (Eng.); Re CB (Unmarried Mother) (Blood Test) [1994] 2 F.L.R. 762 
(Eng.).     
 70 See infra Part III.A. 
 71 S. Leeb-Lundberg et al., Helping Parents to Tell Their Children About the Use of Donor 
Insemination (DI) and Determining Their Opinions About Open-Identity Sperm Donors, 85 
ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 78, 78 (2006).  
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Regulations modified English law72 by removing the right to anonymity from 
gamete donors and giving adult children conceived through donor conception 
the right to acquire the identity of the donor.73  Conversely, in the United 
States, neither state nor federal legislation prohibits or enforces anonymous 
sperm donation.74  Nonbinding professional guidelines have traditionally 
recommended that gamete donors remain anonymous,75 but in 2004, the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine Ethics Committee endorsed 
disclosure by parents to their children about the use of donor gametes.76 
The different approaches of these selected legislatures to this issue are 
briefly outlined in this Part, and then principles from these four jurisdictions 
will be used to support arguments for and against the acknowledgement of an 
absolute right of the child to know his origins. 
A.  France: Anonymity Rules 
Traditional French “respect for life” arguments for the maintenance of 
accouchement sous X 77 have joined with the feminist “pro-choice” argument 
to form an “anti-biological” opposition to arguments for a right to origins.78  
Instead, the parent–child relationship is considered a “purely social 
construction.”79  In France, maternity and motherhood were historically 
regarded as clearly separate, and women have possessed the right to give 
birth anonymously (accouchement sous X) since the Revolution.80  Anyone 
who discloses the identity of a donor registered in France is, in principle, 
liable to criminal prosecution.81  However, French law does provide for the 
                                                                                                                   
 72 Wherever English law is referred to in this Article, it includes references to Welsh law. 
 73 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) 
Regulations, 2004, S.I. 2004/1511 (U.K.) [hereinafter Regulation 2004/1511]; Press Release, 
U.K. Dep’t of Health, Anonymity to Be Removed from Future Sperm, Egg and Embryo 
Donors (Jan. 21, 2004). 
 74 Lucy Frith, Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical and Legal Debate, 16 HUM. 
REPROD. 818, 819 (2001). 
 75 Id. (citing ETHICS COMM., AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1998)).  
 76 Ethics Comm., Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Informing Offspring of Their Conception by 
Gamete Donation, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527, 527 (2004).   
 77 Translated as the right to anonymous birth. 
 78 JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN & CATHERINE LABRUSSE-RIOU, PRODUIRE L’HOMME: DE QUEL 
DROIT? ETUDE JURIDIQUE ET ÉTHIQUE DES PROCRÉATIONS ARTIFICIELLES (1987).   
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 313–14; see also CODE DE LA SANTÉ PUBLIQUE art. L1211-
5 (Fr.).  The state utilizes this legislation to promote the public goal of protecting the mother 
 
2012]       A BALANCING ACT?  635 
 
collection of non-identifying data about birth mothers asking for anonymity 
and states that these birth mothers may end their anonymity at any time.82   
But children still have no right to access documents revealing the biological 
mother’s name, and the possibility of establishing any bond between the 
mother and the child is generally prohibited.83  However, since the CRC 
came into force, secret birth can be lifted on request of the child and with the 
assent of the mother.84  Further non-identifying information has also been 
made more easily accessible through independent sources.85  
B.  Sweden and England: Banning Anonymity but No Absolute Right 
Both Sweden and England have banned anonymous sperm donation.86  In 
1984, Sweden was the first country to remove the anonymity of sperm 
donors.87  A child born in Sweden through donor insemination has the right, 
but only when “sufficiently mature,” to receive information about the use of 
donor insemination and the identity of the donor.88  
Two decades after the introduction of this legislation, studies indicate that 
Swedish parents are becoming more comfortable with disclosing the 
circumstances of donor conception to their children.  An early study 
conducted in 2000, found that only 11% of Swedish parents had informed 
their children about the nature of their conception.89  An additional 41% of 
the parents intended to tell their children at a later time.90  It should be noted, 
though, that the children of parents that intended to disclose information to at 
a later date were young, the average age being three-and-a half years old.91  
                                                                                                                   
and child at the birth, preventing illegal abortions and child abandonment. BLAUWHOFF, supra 
note 12, at 395. 
 82 BLAUWHOFF supra note 12, at 196; see generally CODE DE L’ACTION SOCIALE ET DES 
FAMILLES art. L147-1 (Fr.).  An important function of the Code de l’Action Sociale et des 
Familles is to gather together information requested by all departments, overseas territories, 
and relevant organizations and to make it easier to access information about one’s origins.  Id.    
 83 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 311-19 (Fr.). 
 84 BLAUWHOFF supra note 12, at 120–21. 
 85 Besson, supra note 23, at 154.   
 86 LAG OM INSEMINATION (Svensk forfattningssamling [SFS] 1984:1140) (Swed.); 
Regulation 2004/1511, supra note 73, art. 2, para. 3. 
 87 Frith, supra note 74. 
 88 4 § LAG OM INSEMINATION (SFS 1984:1140) (Swed.); see A. Lalos et al., Legislated Right 
for Donor-Insemination Children to Know Their Genetic Origin: A Study of Parental 
Thinking, 22 HUM. REPROD. 1759, 1759 (2007).  
 89 Gottlieb et al., supra note 12, at 2055.  
 90 Id.  The mean age of the children who had been told was five-and-a-half years old, and 
that of those who might be told in the future was three-and-a-half.  Id. at 2053–54. 
 91 Id. at 2053. 
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In a Swedish study for 2006, 75% of parents were found to have disclosed or 
to be intending to disclose the nature of the conception.92  Most recently, a 
study published in 2011 found that as many as 90% of parents who had used 
donor conception supported disclosure and openness to children concerning 
their genetic origin.93 
The reasons furnished by parents for increased openness were the 
avoidance of an accidental discovery by the child, a general desire for 
openness, and recognition of the child’s fundamental right to know.94  Thus, 
in Sweden, the rates of disclosure have improved significantly, which may 
indicate that the removal of anonymity and counseling have facilitated 
disclosure.95  Further studies are required to determine whether the parents 
who intended to disclose their real identities to their donor-conceived 
offspring, actually did so. 
English law has increasingly become a champion for the right to know 
one’s origins and the importance of the genetic family.  Adoptive parents are 
now encouraged to allow adopted children to know about their biological 
parents and even to have contact with them if it is in their child’s best 
interests.  Similarly, after divorce, the courts encourage children to remain in 
contact with their nonresident fathers.96  This same trend is apparent in 
regard to donor-conceived children.  Judicial arguments in England and 
Wales now acknowledge the right of a donor-conceived child to identifying 
information under Article 8 of the ECHR.97  Furthermore, beginning in April 
2005 donor-conceived adults were allowed to obtain identifying information 
from the Human Embryology and Fertility Authority register, which is 
                                                                                                                   
 92 S. Isaksson et al., Two Decades After Legislation on Identifiable Donors in Sweden: Are 
Recipient Couples Ready to Be Open About Using Gamete Donation?, 26 HUM. REPROD. 853, 
853 (2011). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Lalos et al., supra note 88, at 1765.  Parents who had not told their children feared public 
attitudes and considered artificial insemination a private matter.  Id. at 1766.  
 95 A Swedish study found that counseling may help some couples to find the right “scripts” 
to inform their child about their conception, for example, by referring to the donor as a “kind 
man” who was eager to assist them in overcoming their problems.  Id. at 1762. 
 96 Carol Smart, Family Secrets: Law and Understandings of Openness in Everyday 
Relationships, 38 J. SOC. POL’Y 551, 564 (2009). 
 97 Rose v. Secretary of State for Health, [2002] EWHC (Admin) 1593, [2002] 2 F.L.R. 962, 
[47]–[48].  In this case, the court recognized the right of such a child to the knowledge of the 
identity of his or her father.  The judge held that there is “an obligation on the state to allow the 
ties of family life to develop normally and that this obligation is not limited to compelling a state 
to abstain from interference with family life; it may require the existence in domestic law of legal 
safeguards that render family life possible.  The same . . . applies to respect for private life which 
often cannot be separately compartmentalized from family life . . . .”  Id. [42]. 
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supplied to clinics.98  Also beginning in April 2005 clinics obtained 
identifying information from all donors99  and in 2023 the first eighteen-year-
old, donor-conceived adults will have the right to establish the identity of 
their sperm donors.100  The inconsistency of information provided by donors 
in the past is likely to continue to pose problems.  Before the banning of 
donor anonymity, clinics were advised to encourage donors to record as 
much non-identifying information as they could,101 but earlier studies 
                                                                                                                   
 98 Regulation 2004/1511, supra note 73, art. 2, para. 3.  In England, donor-conceived 
people are also currently entitled to information about half-siblings who share the same donor.  
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 31ZA (U.K.) [hereinafter HFEA 
1990].  The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, as amended by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (U.K.) [hereinafter HFEA 2008], grants them 
the right to ascertain the existence, number, sex, year of birth, and, by mutual agreement, the 
identity of other individuals sharing the same donor.  HFEA 1990, supra, §§ 31ZA(2)(b), 
31ZE.  Donor-conceived children aged sixteen and above have the right to know (with the 
specified person’s consent) whether or not they may be related to a specified person with 
whom they intend to enter into a marriage, a civil partnership, or an intimate physical 
relationship.  Id. § 31ZB.  Once aged eighteen, donor-conceived children have the right to 
obtain identifying information about any donor-conceived genetic siblings who are also at 
least eighteen and who have agreed to identifying information being released to a genetically 
related sibling who is requesting such information.  Id. § 31ZE(2).  Donors also have the right 
to access non-identifying information about children conceived through the use of their 
gametes, such as number, sex, and dates of birth.  Id. § 31ZD.  
 99 Regulation 2004/1511, supra note 73, art. 2, para. 3.  In a study intended to investigate 
the new phenomenon of parents of donor children contacting donor siblings, 791 participants 
provided information regarding their reasons for attempting to find their child’s biological 
parent and siblings, the outcome of the searches, and their experiences regarding contact with 
biological family members that were found.  T. Freeman et al., Gamete Donation: Parents’ 
Experiences of Searching for Their Child’s Donor Siblings and Donor, 24 HUM. REPROD. 505, 
505 (2009).  Whereas parents’ principal motivation for seeking out donors was enhancing 
their child’s sense of identity, the primary reason for seeking out donor siblings was curiosity.  
Id.  Searches for donor siblings sometimes led to the discovery of a large number of donor 
siblings.  Id.  Ultimately, a majority of the parents who participated in the study reported a 
positive experience with the process.  Id.  These findings emphasize that  
having access to information about a child’s donor origins is important for 
some parents and has potentially positive consequences.  These findings have 
wider implications because the removal of donor anonymity in the UK and 
elsewhere means that increasing numbers of donor offspring are likely to 
seek contact with their donor relations in the future.  
Id. 
 100 See RESPONSE TO DRAFT BILL, supra note 11, para. 66 (noting that donor-conceived 
persons born after 2005 have the right to access identifying and non-identifying information). 
 101 Donor Recruitment, Assessment and Screening, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY 
AUTHORITY, para. 11.9, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/498.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).  The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has collected personal information about the 
donor such as the donor’s name at the time of donation, name at time of birth, place of birth 
and whether or not the donor has children and some physical characteristics since 1991.  
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suggested that the information provided on the forms was sparse and most 
donors preferred not to complete any of the optional parts.102   
Despite new legislation promoting disclosure to donor-conceived 
children, both English and Swedish law continue to allow an infertile couple 
who has used donor conception to pass the child off as entirely their own 
biological child.103  One research study indicated that as many as 46% of 
donor-conceived children in England grow up assuming that their legal 
parents are also their biological parents.104  
C.  United States: No Federal Legislative Regulation 
The minimal presence of state and federal regulation of the sperm donor 
industry in the United States has resulted in a patchwork of nonbinding 
professional guidelines and use of individual clinical discretion.105  “Almost 
                                                                                                                   
However, providing that information did not become compulsory until 2005.  HFEA 1990, 
supra note 98. 
 102 See Making Your Decision, DONOR CONCEPTION NETWORK, http://www.dcnetwork.org/m 
aking-your-decision (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (noting the lack of donor information 
available to clinics in multiple nations). 
 103 See Lalos et al., supra note 88 (noting the failure of the law to determine who, if anyone, 
has the duty to inform children of their donor-conceived status); S. Golombok et al., Non-
Genetic and Non-Gestational Parenthood: Consequences for Parent–Child Relationships and 
the Psychological Well-Being of Mothers, Fathers and Children at Age 3, 21 HUM. REPROD. 
1918, 1921 (2006). 
 104 See Golombok et al., supra note 103, at 1921 (noting that 46% of parents had no 
intention of ever informing their children regarding donor-conceived status). 
 105 Frith, supra note 74.  Some states have enacted legislation proclaiming that the donor, 
child, or both acknowledge the absence of rights or duties with regard to the other.  See, e.g., 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.239 (West 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D) (2011).  Some 
states establish that the sperm donor has no rights as father and, if the woman is married, that 
her husband is the legal father.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (1987); 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 40/2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 97-1136 of 2012 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. Dom. Rel. 
Law § 73 (McKinney 2008).  Nine States have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, 
which allows agencies that maintain birth records to release such information to donors, state 
and federal agencies, and courts only.  Uniform Parentage Act (2000); see, e.g., Alabama 
Uniform Parentage Act, ALA. CODE § 26-17-101 (2008).  Twelve states have adopted the 1973 
Uniform Parentage Act which calls for donor information to be confidential, but subject to 
inspection by the court upon a showing of good cause.  Uniform Parentage Act (1973); see, 
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600–7730 (West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4-101 to -130 
(1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1975); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1-45/28 
(1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to -1138 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.55–.75 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 210.817–854 (2000).  In Johnson v. Superior Court, the court acknowledged that 
California possessed a compelling interest in protecting the health and welfare of children 
conceived by artificial insemination and that at times it became necessary for those using 
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all fertility clinics in the United States now offer detailed, non-identifying 
information about the potential donor’s characteristics and medical 
history,”106 and an increasing number of clinics offer recipients the choice of 
gametes from donors who agree to be identified.  In most of these 
arrangements, the donor contractually permits the clinic to release 
identifying information to resulting children in the future, if the child asks for 
it.107  Clinics, such as the California Sperm Bank, may offer both the donor 
and the couple a choice of anonymous or open donors and match them 
accordingly.108   
Though most sperm banks tend to comply with professional guidelines, 
inconsistencies still exist nationally.109  A large number of fertility clinics 
discard the relevant documentation as soon as an insemination procedure is 
finished.110  This practice is acceptable because the guidelines are voluntary, 
not binding.111   
IV.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NONDISCLOSURE 
A policy of nondisclosure may be perceived as a way of ensuring that, 
firstly, the nongenetic parent feels connected to the child; secondly, the child 
develops a strong bond with the one genetic parent; thirdly, the appearance 
of a “normal” family is maintained; fourthly, there is as little disruption of 
the child’s stability as possible; and finally, the genetic parent’s infertility (a 
condition that may still carry a negative stigma in some societies) is able to 
remain undisclosed.  This “nondisclosure model” favors the interests of the 
                                                                                                                   
artificial insemination to obtain biological and genetic information about their child’s donor.  
95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  In such cases, the court held that parents of 
donor-conceived children must have some avenue to uncover the otherwise confidential 
documentation regarding artificial insemination and ordered the disclosure of information that 
was necessary and relevant to the litigation to the person who sought the information.  Id. at 
879. 
 106 See Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for Non-Anonymous Gamete 
Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 11–12 (2008). 
 107 Id. at 12. 
 108 Barbara Raboy, Secrecy and Openness in Donor Insemination: A New Paradigm, 12 
POL. & LIFE SCI. 191, 191 (1993) (noting that 80% of the clinic’s recipients chose to use open 
donors). 
 109 Pino D’Orazio, Note, Half of the Family Tree: A Call for Access to a Full Genetic 
History for Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 249, 258 
n.35 (2006). 
 110 Id. at 262. 
 111 Id. at 258. 
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would-be parents, the child’s need for stability and normality, and the 
privacy rights of the sperm donor.  
A.  Focusing on the Would-Be Parents 
1.  Deliberate Deception or Legitimate Failure to Disclose? 
Parents’ failure to inform a donor-conceived child of the method of his 
conception could be perceived as deliberately deceptive behavior, especially 
if children have a fundamental right to know about their genetic origins and 
to information about essential aspects of their personal history.112  However, 
some parents may consider secrecy necessary if their society would ostracize 
them because of the fertility problem or disapprove of the method of 
conception of their children.113  A New Zealand study of attitudes of would-
be parents indicated that, in the 1970s, donors were not considered persons 
with rights to inclusion in their construction of their family; these couples 
felt the connection of genes to parentage was artificially constructed by 
society.114  For many of them, the act of sperm donation was perceived as 
nothing more than an altruistic gift or a marketable service such as a blood or 
organ donation.115 
2.  Parents’ Reasons for Nondisclosure 
A study of would-be parents’ perceptions regarding the role of donors 
reflected a number of tensions: a gratitude toward the donor, the desire never 
to meet the donor, the fear that the child might think of the donor as the 
“real” father, the belief that the donor is a kind person, and a constant 
reminder to the male partner of his infertility and the possible shame 
associated with it.116  Parents’ reasons for not informing their children 
                                                                                                                   
 112 Andrew Bainham, Arguments About Parentage, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 322, 335–36 (2008) 
(arguing that the law should oblige parents to inform their children that they are donor-
conceived).  Bainham raised this argument before the Joint Committee on the Human Tissue 
and Embryos (Draft) Bill in 2007.  Id. at 334; JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, para. 
270.  The government has undertaken to keep this issue under review.  RESPONSE TO DRAFT 
BILL, supra note 11, para. 70. 
 113 Robyn Rowland, The Social and Psychological Consequences of Secrecy in Artificial 
Insemination by Donor (AID) Programmes, 21 SOC. SCI. & MED. 391, 393 (1985). 
 114 Victoria M. Grace et al., The Donor, the Father, and the Imaginary Constitution of the 
Family: Parents’ Constructions in the Case of Donor Insemination, 66 SOC. SCI. & MED. 301, 
302 (2008).  
 115 Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 291. 
 116 Grace et al., supra note 114, at 304.  
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differed widely; some intended parents indicate that their views were 
ambivalent, dominated by a focus both on their own role as parents and their 
desire to act in their children’s best interests.117  Other studies found that the 
main reason why mothers were against disclosure or unsure about telling the 
truth was because they wished to protect their children and were concerned 
that other family members might perceive the child in a different light if the 
child’s real genetic parentage was extensively known.118  Truth may at times 
damage complex kinship relationships, and parents are often afraid of the 
consequences of such knowledge in the interests of the family.119  Carol 
Smart’s empirical research explores the complex area of family secrets, 
querying the idea that there is a simple “physical” truth.120  Smart examines 
the reasons why genetic parentage has become so significant, indicating that 
there are certain secrets that have always existed in family life.121  Kinship 
depends upon lived and meaningful relationships.122  In the world of natural 
conception, as well as donor-conceived birth, the reality of family life may 
be harsh and complex.  For example, indicating to a husband that a child was 
conceived from a short-lived liaison could result in a dire economic position 
for mother and child; though the child may live in the knowledge of her 
paternity, she and her mother may be economically destitute.123  The interests 
of truth may have to be sacrificed, at times, for family stability and security 
in the interests of the child.  Legal truth (founded exclusively on genetic 
testing) can cut through and disrupt these relationships.124 
3.  Discrimination Against “Social” Parents 
The potential impact of the disclosure policy on would-be parents should 
not be overlooked.125  Parents may be of the view that nondisclosure is the 
wisest way to protect the child, themselves, and the wider family.126  As a 
                                                                                                                   
 117 Id.  
 118 Smart, supra note 30, at 400. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Smart, supra note 96, at 553 (pointing out that there may be other truths, which may be 
just as or more significant in family life and particularly for a child). 
 121 Id. at 558–61. 
 122 Id. at 555.  
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at 564–65.  For example, the wish not to reveal paternity of a child may arise from a 
mother’s need to protect a child rather than simply to preserve her own reputation.  Lyn 
Turney, Paternity Secrets: Why Women Don’t Tell, 11 J. FAM. STUD. 227, 243 (2005). 
 125 During the anonymity debate leading up to the English legislation banning donor 
anonymity, these interests were largely ignored.  Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 292. 
 126 Id. at 304. 
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result, they tell their child that they were assisted in the conception process 
rather than disclosing the child’s genetic parents.127 
For many parents, gestating, breast feeding, rearing, or nurturing a baby is 
of far greater importance than a purely genetic relationship.  If the law were 
to impose a legal obligation on such parents to inform their children of the 
nature of their conception—or ensure that the child is informed by means of 
birth certificate or a letter delivered when the child reaches a certain age—
would this not constitute an unjustifiable invasion of the privacy rights of 
would-be parents, especially since fertile parents have been deceiving 
natural-born children about their conception for generations?  Would it not 
be discriminatory to such social parents, especially when compared with 
biological parents?  This might discourage such couples from conceiving 
with the use of donor sperm and lead to a diminution of the number of 
couples having children via this method, thus depriving them of a family.  
Rather, tolerance, openness, and gradual acceptance of this method of 
conception over time are the only ways in which to create the notion of such 
an obligation to disclose. 
B.  Focusing on the Sperm Donor 
1.  Protection of the Sperm Donor 
Gamete donors may be motivated to donate in order to help sterile 
couples, but wish to avoid a parental relationship with the resulting offspring.  
As a result, many will have a fundamental interest in their own privacy.128  
Sperm donors may view anonymity as reassurance that their genetic 
parentage cannot be established and protection from disruptive effects on 
their own marriage or family life—interruptions which could not be foreseen 
or desired by a child eager to know his or her genetic origins.129   
Increased access to information through the Internet has had a profound 
effect on donors’ ability to maintain anonymity.  The Internet has enabled 
donor-conceived persons to acquire much more information regarding their 
donor parent once they discover the nature of their conception.130  As a 
                                                                                                                   
 127 Id. 
 128 Julie L. Sauer, Competing Interests and Gamete Donation: The Case for Anonymity, 39 
SETON HALL L. REV. 919, 943 (2009).  
 129 K.R. Daniels et al., The Views of Sperm Semen Donors Regarding the Swedish 
Insemination Act 1984, 3 MED. L. INT’L 117, 124 (1998).  
 130 Andrea Mechanick Braverman, How the Internet Is Reshaping Assisted Reproduction: 
From Donor Offspring Registries to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. 
& TECH. 477, 486–87, 495 (2010). 
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result, the sperm donor is no longer an impassive component of the process.  
Instead, sperm donors are now perceived as possibly having a long-term role 
in the life of the donor-conceived child.131  However, there are dangers 
associated with unlimited Internet access to unverified donor information.  
The information may be inaccurate, insufficient, biased, out-of-date, or just 
not what the donor-conceived person wishes to know.132  Because of the 
increased use of the Internet to find donors, perhaps a well-regulated system 
where information provided is accurate and easily available may provide the 
best means of meeting the needs of all stakeholders.133  
2.  Detrimental Effects of Removal of Donor Anonymity 
In England, the main consequence of legislation removing donor 
anonymity has been an acute shortage of sperm donors.134  Because of 
donors’ reluctance to donate, English clinics cannot meet the demand for 
gametes.135  Clinics maintain long waiting lists of patients who wish to get 
treatment, and patients are increasingly participating in reproductive tourism 
to countries where anonymity is still permitted to avoid the negative impact 
of the law.136  As recruited gamete donors become less willing to make 
donations, there is pressure to accept donors with suboptimal characteristics; 
for example, in England the age profile of the average donor has increased.137  
                                                                                                                   
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 493. 
 133 Id. at 496. 
 134 Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 284. 
 135 Jane Dreaper, IVF Donor Sperm Shortage Revealed, BBC News (Sept. 13, 2006), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/5341982.stm. 
 136 Two of Scotland’s four NHS clinics suspended services because of a lack of donors.  
Figures from Scotland’s IVF Clinics, BBC News (June 10, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
uk_news/scotland/5065050.stm.  In one clinic, the waiting time for egg donation treatment 
more than doubled after donor anonymity was removed, from two years to at least five years.  
Id.  Another clinic had no new donations since the law was introduced and there were between 
thirty and forty patients that the clinic was unable to treat.  Id.  One clinic reported that for the 
first time they had to start a waiting list for treatment using donor sperm at the end of last year 
and they were no longer able to offer any treatment until supplies became available.  Id.  In 
the Netherlands, the total number of sperm donors decreased from 900 to 300, sperm banks 
have decreased by half, and the waiting time for treatment surpassed two years in a ten-year 
span.  William Weber, Dutch Sperm Donors Will Remain Anonymous For Another Two Years, 
355 LANCET 1249, 1249 (2000). 
 137 Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 284, 288.  In September 2005, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority reported that donors in 2004 and 2005 were typically 
family men aged between thirty-six and forty years.  HUMAN FERTILISATION AND 
EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, WHO ARE THE DONORS? AN HFEA ANALYSIS OF DONOR 
REGISTRATIONS AND USE OF DONOR GAMETES OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS, at 5 (2005) available 
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It has also led to the development of an underground semen market on the 
Internet, which often utilizes unscreened semen.138 
The desire to sustain a continuous supply of donors is a frequent 
argument in support of the existing legal position in the United States and 
France.139  Opponents of mandated disclosure have argued that the fertility 
industry in the United States would disappear with a move toward mandatory 
disclosure of donor information.140  In Britain, anticipation of the new donor 
legislation in 2005 contributed to the drop in the number of donors.141  
However, it seems that there are more donations from older, more 
magnanimously motivated donors.  As a result, if similar legislation were 
adopted in the United States, it is arguable that the amount of sperm 
donations may plateau at an acceptable rate after a few years, as happened in 
Sweden and appears to be happening in England.142 
                                                                                                                   
at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Who_are_the_donors_factsheet.pdf.  This represents a 
substantial change from 1994 and 1995 when the most common age group for sperm donors 
was eighteen and twenty-four years.  Id. 
 138 Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 284. 
 139 Id. 
 140 D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 272. 
 141 E.g., Waldman, supra note 12, at 555 (citing British Sperm Banks Near Empty, NEWS24 
(Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.news24.com/World/News/British-sperm-banks-near-empty-20060 
925).  In 1998 and 1999 when confidentiality was assured under English law, there were more 
than 10,000 donor insemination treatments performed; by 2003 when public debate over donor 
children’s information rights was in full swing, that number had fallen to little more than 6,000.  
The Newcastle Fertility Centre reported a drop from 175 donor applicants in 1994 to only 25 
applicants in 2003.  Donor’s Crisis Over Anonymity, DAILY MAIL, Nov. 10, 2005, at 36.  It was 
reported that the number of donors diminished to less than 100 in the first six months of 2005 
after the legislation.  Ed Boyle, Supply and Demand, CBS NEWS (Aug. 3, 2006), http://www.cbs 
news.com/video/watch/?id=1864669n.  However, representatives for the HFEA disputed these 
figures and pointed out that supply still continues to outstrip demand in some areas of the U.K.  
Sperm Donor Law ‘Not a Deterrent,’ BBC NEWS (June 8, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk 
_news/england/5054910.stm.  Similar problems were experienced in New Zealand when 
anonymous donation was prohibited.  Waldman, supra note 12, at 554 (citing Emily Watt, 
Wanted: Keen Kiwi Lads to Help Populate Australia, SUNDAY STAR TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, 
at 1).  A normally healthy roster of donors dwindled in the two years following the legislation 
to a sole donor.  Id. 
 142 Waldman, supra note 12, at 552–53, 555; see also Paula Beauchamp, Canadians Answer 
Sperm Call, AUSTRALIAN (July 9, 2004), http://www.canadiancrc.com/newspaper_articles/Th 
e_Australian_Canadian_sperm_donors_09JUL04.aspx (reporting that the state of Victoria 
managed to keep the sperm center operational by focusing on older more altruistic donors, but 
in New South Wales, there was such a shortage of donors that one clinic apparently flew 
Canadian students to Australia for complementary vacations, in return for three or four sperm 
donations a week). 
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C.  Focusing on the Child 
1.  The Child’s Right to Life and Autonomy 
The arguments in favor of mandatory disclosure generally assume that 
disclosure is in the best interest of all donor offspring, but there is no clear 
evidence that knowledge of identifying information is required or even 
beneficial for the well-being of donor offspring.143  In fact, psychological 
research supports the viewpoint that a genetic relationship is not essential for 
good social parenting or satisfactory emotional development of children.144  
What of a child who states that he or she does not wish to know?  Should 
such a child be obliged to know for his or her own long-term good?  Finally, 
at what stage should the child be told?  Who decides what age is best to tell a 
child that he or she was conceived through donation?  The value of a right to 
openness for a child is questionable when a child is never conceived because 
gamete donors are reluctant to accept a long-term commitment from which 
they may only expect to derive costs.   
Disclosure about the process of donor conception requires the child to 
differentiate between the “social” and the “biological” aspects of parenthood.  
Obviously, historically this schism was not present, and legislators or 
drafters of rights on parentage are generally not ready to take on the 
unfamiliar topic.  They fail to recognize that a sense of identity is generally 
the result of the child’s experience rather than an adult imposition.145  An 
overemphasis on genes does not give full recognition to the bonds created by 
nurture and love by the child’s actual caretakers.146  It may also lead to a 
desire to establish a relationship with donors at the expense of valuable 
bonds with the child’s extended family.147  There is also the danger that a 
donor-conceived child might wish to establish a relationship with the donor 
and then be rejected.148 
                                                                                                                   
 143 Daniels et al., supra note 129, at 155. 
 144 Susan Golombok et al., Families Created by the New Reproductive Technologies: 
Quality of Parenting and Social and Emotional Development of the Children, 66 CHILD DEV. 
285, 295–97 (1995).  
 145 Smart, supra note 96, at 555. 
 146 Id.; see generally Re J (Paternity: Welfare of Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 2837, [2007] 
2 F.L.R. 26 (recognizing that the impact on the mother and father of revealing donor 
conception to a child outweighed the advantage of the child of learning the truth). 
 147 Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 298–99. 
 148 Sauer, supra note 128, at 941. 
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2.  The Analogy of Adoption  
The literature on adoption over the past thirty years has emphasized the 
right of children to know their biological origins because of the importance 
of that knowledge to a child’s identity formation.149  Those who draw 
analogies between adoption and donor conception favor openness and 
believe that children have a right to and a medical need for information about 
their origins.150    
However, an adopted child’s relationship with her social or legal parents 
is distinct from a donor-conceived child’s relationship with her birth parents.  
In adoption proceedings, the state is involved because adoption is, at least in 
Western countries, a state-created and state-controlled procedure.151  Thus 
the state has an interest in regulating identifying information in adoption 
cases.152  Alternatively, the medical profession rather than the state is 
generally engaged in the procedure of anonymous artificial insemination.  
Adoption and donor-assisted conception are also different in that adoption 
involves the creation of a family around an already existing individual, but 
donor conception is a form of procreation where one parent is biologically 
related to the child and the child’s conception is greatly desired.153   
These differences contribute to the difficulty of analogizing the two 
situations and calls into question some countries insistence on the 
comparability between adopted and donor-conceived children.154  In this 
instance, a rights-based approach should not trump one based on the 
evidence of researchers into the welfare of such children and would-be 
parents.155  Although research on adopted children indicates that such 
children need information about their birth as early as possible, no 
convincing research has found a corresponding benefit in disclosing donor 
                                                                                                                   
 149 Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 289.  Baroness Warnock, Chair of the 1984 Warnock 
Committee of Inquiry into Fertilisation and Embryology, stated that she supported the view 
that donor-conceived people should have the same “right to know” as adopted people.  
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 150 Glenn McGee et al., Gamete Donation and Anonymity: Disclosure to Children 
Conceived with Donor Gametes Should Not Be Optional, 16 HUM. REPROD. 2033, 2034–35 
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 151 Sauer, supra note 128, at 942. 
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 153 Erica Haimes, ‘Secrecy’: What Can Artificial Reproduction Learn From Adoption?, 2 
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 46, 47 (1988). 
 154 Turkmendag et al., supra note 6, at 289–91. 
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information to donor-conceived children.  In fact, research indicates that 
children who have not been told are well-adjusted and generally stable.156 
3.  Child’s Welfare and Knowledge of Genetic Origins  
Although findings from research and clinical experience tend to support a 
child’s need for openness about factual circumstances,157 a far more complex 
picture emerges when it comes to access to donor identity.  Knowledge of 
the identity of birth parents can contribute to the child’s inner development 
but does not seem to be essential.158  There does not appear to be clear data 
that nondisclosure to donor-conceived children has been exacting a 
psychological cost on such children.159   
Though some studies have indicated that there a negative effect results 
from failure to disclose donor information, the methodology used in at least 
some of those studies raised concerns.  For example, one study performed by 
psychologists in the United States examined how donor-conceived children 
felt about the secrecy surrounding their conception, their problems in 
obtaining information, and efforts to make contact with the genetic parent.160  
                                                                                                                   
 156 Id. at 290; FORTIN, supra note 1, at 473.   
 157 See generally Sarah Maclean & Mavis Maclean, Keeping Secrets in Assisted 
Reproduction – The Tension Between Donor Anonymity and the Need of the Child for 
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openness when questions arise about a child’s biological origin). 
 158 Waldman, supra note 12, at 525–26.  It has been argued that lack of knowledge of one’s 
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Humphrey & Heather Humphrey, A Fresh Look at Genealogical Bewilderment, 59 BRIT. J. 
MED. PSYCHOL. 133, 133 (1986). 
 159 Waldman, supra note 12, at 535–45. 
 160 See generally A.J. Turner & A. Coyle, What Does It Mean to be a Donor Offspring?  The 
Identity Experience of Adults Conceived by Donor Insemination and the Implications for 
Counselling and Therapy, 15 HUM. REPROD. 2041, 2042 (2000).  In this study, participants 
were recruited from donor conception support networks in the Australia, Canada, United 
Kingdom, and United States.  Id. at 2043.  The participants were required to complete a 
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That study concluded that such children felt alienated from their families, 
suggesting that anonymous donation had a very negative effect on the donor 
offspring, and there was a need to move toward increased openness in this 
area of the law.161  However, that study may have been misleading as only 
sixteen people completed the study, and those people were not a truly 
random sample because only disenchanted donor-conceived children were 
contacted to participate.162    
More useful are the controlled studies performed in Europe.163  Overall, 
family relationships within the families of donor-conceived children were 
found to be stronger than those within families of naturally conceived 
children, and the mental health and development of the donor-conceived 
children was found to be no different from that of their peers in natural 
families.164  Such children were reassessed in adolescence.165  In this group, 
                                                                                                                   
questionnaire, which reported feelings of rejection by and distance from their would-be 
fathers.  Id. at 2043–44.  The participants reported that the discovery of their donor offspring 
status was horrifying to them and a blow to their sense of self; they felt a powerful desire to 
know more about their biological donors and a feeling of loss that they did not know their 
genetic father.  Id. at 2044–46. 
 161 Id. at 2050. 
 162 Id. at 2043. 
 163 E.g., S. Golombok et al., The European Study of Assisted Reproduction Families: Family 
Functioning and Child Development, 11 HUM. REPROD. 2324, 2324 (1996).  This study 
included children conceived using donor eggs or sperm, and adoptive children.  Id. at 2325.  
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The study found that parents of children conceived via donor insemination obtained higher 
ratings for parental warmth and emotional involvement than parents of children conceived 
naturally.  Id. at 2330.  Furthermore, the study found that the quality of the relationship 
between donor insemination fathers and their children was not affected by the lack of a 
genetic tie.  Id.  The donor-conceived children had high self-esteem and strong emotional 
attachment toward their social parents.  Id.  There was no evidence of increased occurrences 
of psychological disorders and the children’s perceptions of their relationship with their 
parents were similar to those of naturally conceived and adopted children.  Id.  But cf. 
ELIZABETH MARQUARDT ET AL., COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE, MY DADDY’S NAME IS 
DONOR: A NEW STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS CONCEIVED THROUGH SPERM DONATION (2010), 
available at http://www.familyscholars.org/assets/Donor_FINAL.pdf.  The study found that 
young adults conceived through sperm donation are “hurting more, are more confused, [and] 
feel more isolated from their families.”  Id. at 5.  It is significant, however, that this study 
researched children raised by heterosexual married couples, single mothers, and lesbian 
couples.  Id. at 44.  Research focusing solely on donor-conceived children born to 
heterosexual couples finds them to be generally well-adjusted.  Golombok et al., supra note 
13, at 965. 
 164 Waldman, supra note 12, at 539. 
 165 S. Golombok et al., The European Study of Assisted Reproduction Families: The 
Transition to Adolescence, 17 HUM. REPROD. 830, 830 (2002); see also Waldman, supra note 
12, at 539–41. 
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nearly 70% of parents had decided not to inform their children about their 
origins.166  Research compared the socio-emotional function and the quality 
of the parental relationship with donor-conceived children who were told and 
those who were not told of their donor status.167  Children in both groups 
were doing equally well in terms of school performance, confidence, and 
peer relationships; groups who told their children about the use of a donor 
reported fewer child–mother disputes than those who did not disclose.168  
Donor-conceived children who were not told, although not as well-off as 
those who had been told, were still doing well emotionally and socially and 
did not appear to be much damaged by the nature of their origins in terms of 
their relationship with their mothers.169  It should be noted, however, that this 
set of results also appears unreliable, as only six sets of families had 
informed their children.170  Another study examining whether disclosure of 
the identity of the donor affected parental bonding found that among 184 
families, there was no evidence that nondisclosure was harmful for family 
relationship or a symptom of family problems.171  What this research 
indicates is that donor-conceived children who are unaware of their donor 
status are flourishing within their families, and there is little reason to be 
concerned for their welfare.  In light of these results, legislatures need to 
assess carefully the risk of compulsory disclosure on such families.  
V.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCLOSURE 
The next Part of this Article aims to assess fully the nature of the child’s 
right to know his or her biological origins and the advantages of openness 
and disclosure to such a child.  
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were inclined toward disclosure.  Id. at 173.  The study found that non-disclosing mothers 
reported more conflict with their children and perceived themselves as less competent parents 
than disclosing mothers.  Id. at 175–76.  But this was not evidence of dysfunctionality in the 
family, which was generally well-adjusted.  Id. at 179.  In nondisclosure families the 
relationship between children and parents was found to be still within a functional and normal 
range.  Id. 
 170 Lycett et al., supra note 169, at 178. 
 171 Robert D. Nachtigall et al., Stigma, Disclosure, and Family Functioning Among Parents 
of Children Conceived Through Donor Insemination, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY 83, 89 
(1997).   
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A.  The Importance of Genes 
Scientific strides made toward decoding the human genome have 
increased the accessibility of full-scale genetic tests.172  Donated gametes, 
particularly in the United States, are usually screened for a great variety of 
hereditary diseases and characteristics.173  Accurate medical history is often 
important in preventative and diagnostic treatment of illnesses.  Specific 
information brings a degree of certainty about future ill health or even the 
mode and manner of one’s own death, and access to donor information may 
provide the donor child with a complete genetic and medical history to make 
health decisions.174  It has been argued that proponents of donor anonymity 
overlook the fact that genetic information was needed in some cases and in 
doing so ignore the individual, personal, and psychological concerns of the 
child involved.175  It is also argued that the lack of mandatory testing, 
screening of donors, general regulation, and control of this process at the 
federal level in the United States has resulted in an assisted reproduction 
industry that is incapable of tackling the issues of donor anonymity and 
access to genetic information through self-regulation.176  
Although some states have enacted legislation permitting donor-
conceived children to obtain gamete donor information through court order 
when they make a satisfactory showing of “good cause” or a similar 
standard,177 it is foreseeable that the strides that continue to be made in 
genetic science demand a system where an individual does not have to wait 
for an illness to gain access to his proper genetic history.178  According to 
this view, states should address the rights of the growing population of donor 
offspring by implementing provisions to guarantee the documentation, 
preservation, and disclosure of donor information and establishing some 
                                                                                                                   
 172 Dennison, supra note 106, at 14. 
 173 Id.  A number of countries, including those that still allow anonymous donation, have 
maintained national registries of donors that serve as a mechanism for tracking a donor should 
the child inherit a disease.  For example, the United Kingdom has maintained a national 
registry since 1991 although donor anonymity was only removed in 2005.  See HFEA 1990, 
supra note 98 (codifying the United Kingdom’s national registry).   
 174 D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 254–55.  
 175 Id. at 264. 
 176 Id. at 256–57. 
 177 ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(a) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 19-4-106(1) (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. 210.824.01 (West 2007); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 40-6-106(1) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061.1 (West 2007).  In these states, 
the courts must assess the interests of the parties to determine what meets the “good cause” 
standard and what information should be disclosed.   
 178 D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 252–55. 
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means of informing such children that they were conceived by sperm 
donation, even though their parents may not intend to do so.179  Further 
research might also support the concept that the benefits of mapping the 
human genome depend not only on people’s individual genotypes and raw 
genetic data, but also on the characteristics that genes produce.180  For 
example, it may be necessary to know not only that a person has a certain 
gene makeup, but that his or her father also had this genetic makeup, and 
developed bowel cancer at fifty.181  This line of argument maintains that, 
unless donor anonymity is lifted, it may be impossible for descendants to 
acquire this beneficial knowledge.182 
B.  Lack of Regulation Leads to Dangerous “Free for All”? 
Most banks comply, on the whole, with professional guidelines, but 
compliance on a national level remains inconsistent.183  Because no federal 
legislation governing sperm banks exists in the United States, clinics are 
allowed to self-regulate screening standards, the number of donations a 
donor may make, the age limits on recipients, and the price of the 
procedure.184  There is no legislation to impose age or health qualifications 
on recipients, regulate advertisement, limit the price for donations, or 
constrain the grounds on which recipients can choose donors.185  Private and 
government studies that have analyzed the artificial insemination industry 
have revealed problems in genetic screening and medical record keeping.186  
                                                                                                                   
 179 Id. 
 180 See BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 22 (discussing hereditary risks and their effect on the 
right of children to know about donor insemination). 
 181 In the United States, federal regulation of assisted reproduction has been at best inactive.  
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 261.  There has not been a statutory focus on the donor’s health 
and a donor offspring’s rights to obtain information about the donor’s health status.  Id.  
About eighteen states provide donor offspring with the right to access donor information 
through a showing of good cause.  Id.  The Uniform Parentage Act, a uniform law 
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCUSL), encourages state codification of the good cause standard.  Uniform Parentage Act 
§ 5(a) (1973). 
 182 D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 249. 
 183 Id. at 257 n.35 (citing Karen M. Ginsberg, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial 
Insemination Industry in the United States, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 823 (1997)). 
  184  Id.  
 185  Id. at 260.   
 186 Id. at 257.  This is concerning as 80% of the world’s largest sperm banks are based in the 
United States and rely on voluntary guidelines.  Lisa Hird Chung, Note, Free Trade in Human 
Reproductive Cells: A Solution to Procreative Tourism and the Unregulated Internet, 15 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 263, 267 (2006).  The federal government “has passed regulations requiring 
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Perhaps because of these issues, the majority of medical professionals are in 
favor of establishing national standards for donor screening and testing for 
genetic defects in donor samples.187  
A major drawback of the lack of regulation in the United States is that it 
is impossible to know how many children result from any particular person’s 
sperm donation.188  Sperm samples from more attractive donors may be 
utilized to inseminate more women and result in more children from that 
particular donor.189  Even in some countries which limit the number of 
children born using a particular donor, as many as twenty-five children might 
be related to a donor.190  In the United States, that number could be even 
higher, increasing the risk of half-siblings unknowingly committing incest 
and spreading undetected genetic disorders.191  Beyond voluntary services 
such as the Donor Sibling Registry, it is impossible for donor-conceived 
children in the United States to know how many other children share the 
same biological donor. 
Although donors are encouraged by the American Fertility Society’s to 
provide detailed medical information for at least two generations of family 
members, undergo a blood analysis and a physical examination for sexually 
transmitted diseases, and provide a sperm sample, compliance with the 
guidelines is voluntary.192  Current regulation of the fertility industry in the 
                                                                                                                   
screening of cell and tissue donors for ‘risk factors for, and clinical evidence of, relevant 
communicable disease.’ ”  Id. at 277. 
 187 D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 257 n.35, 278 (citing Ginsberg, supra note 183).  The Food 
and Drug Administration has adopted regulations requiring screening of donors for relevant 
communicable disease.  Id. at 256 n.33.  As a result, clinics in North America generally screen 
for sexually transmitted disorders, such as HIV, and genetic disorders.  Id. at 258. 
 188 Id. at 265.  
 189 Id.  Sperm banks in the United States are not required to limit the sales of their most 
popular donor sperm.  By contrast, other countries restrict the number of children one sperm 
donor can produce: Denmark limits the number of live births per donor to twenty-five, 
England limits the number to ten, and France limits the number to five.  Chung, supra note 
186, at 275–76. 
 190 Chung, supra note 186, at 275–76. 
 191 Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 5, 2011), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html?pagewanted=all. 
 192 Ginsberg, supra note 183, at 835 (1997). 
The American Fertility Society recommends genetic screening for high-risk 
donors and recommends access to a donor’s non-identifying genetic 
information upon the request of the donor child.  Additionally, the Ethics 
Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine has advised 
sperm clinics to take steps in anticipation that donor children will seek 
information about their donors in the future. 
D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 258.  Further, the American Association of Tissue Banks 
recommends screening donors for certain medical conditions that “present contraindications 
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United States is largely self-imposed and “limited to ensuring that donated 
gametes are free from communicable diseases and easily detectible genetic 
disorders.”193  In Johnson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, however, 
the court held that the state had a compelling interest in an action against an 
artificial insemination clinic in requiring a party to comply with the 
discovery request to disclose the sperm donor’s identity.194  That court 
potentially opened the door to a less anonymous future for sperm donors.195  
It would appear that some regulation of the industry is required in the United 
States, and some monitoring of clinics to ensure uniform standards with 
penalties for noncompliance on certain issues such as the number of children 
which a donor may father. 
C.  Focusing on the Child 
1.  “Genealogical Bewilderment” and the Movement from Welfare to 
Rights 
Public debate on the issue of “genealogical bewilderment” began during 
the 1980s.196  The concept was first developed in relation to the rights of 
adopted children and maintains that “a genealogically bewildered child could 
be found in any family where one of the ‘natural’ parents was unknown [to 
                                                                                                                   
for donation.”  Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The “Orwellian Nightmare” Reconsidered: A 
Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. 
REV. 625, 673 (1991). 
 193 D’Orazio, supra note 109, at 260 n.41 (“Statutes tend to avoid issues concerning the 
donor offspring’s future potential harm in not knowing his biological background or medical 
history.  Only Idaho and Oregon require donors to satisfy certain medical standards.”). 
 194 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  In Johnson, a donor disclosed his family 
medical history to the sperm bank, including the possibility that Autosomal Dominant 
Polycystic Kidney Disease was present in his family.  Id. at 868.  The Johnsons signed a 
confidentiality agreement that provided for the donor to remain anonymous and reserved the 
right of the sperm bank to destroy all information pertaining to the donor’s identity.  Id. at 
867.  Despite assurances from the bank that the sperm was healthy, the child was diagnosed 
six years later with Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease.  Id. at 868.  The court 
concluded that it would not protect the anonymity of the donor if it found that the donor 
offspring’s interests were more compelling than the donor’s interest in maintaining his or her 
anonymity.  Id. at 878. 
 195 Jessica Reaves, So Much For That No-Strings-Attached Stop at the Sperm Bank, TIME 
(Aug. 24, 2000), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,53347,00.html. 
 196 Deborah Dempsey, Donor, Father or Parent? Conceiving Paternity in the Australian 
Family Court, 18 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 76, 81 (2004).  The term “genealogical 
bewilderment” was first used by Sants.  Sants, supra note 158. 
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the child concerned].”197  The argument against anonymity for sperm donors 
is similarly based on the premise that a child’s sense of identity is 
inextricably linked to understanding their biological origins.198  Opponents of 
anonymity, and sometimes of donor insemination generally, rely on the 
argument that biologically correct information about one’s genetic parents is 
necessary for a person to develop self-esteem and a positive sense of 
identity.199  
Where children do not suspect any differences in the circumstances of 
their conception, the children do not usually question their genetic origins.  
Openness and truthfulness in family relationships and respect for the child’s 
autonomy are ethical demands that are almost impossible to convert into a 
legal obligation.  However, in 1969, the English court acquired the power to 
direct paternity testing on a child if the court considered the testing to be in 
the child’s best interest, irrespective of the mother or other caregiver’s 
refusal to consent.200  People began to argue that, in the past, the medical 
underpinning of assisted procreation had led to the prioritization of the 
interests of prospective parents at the expense of their children, and that 
secrecy regarding donors arose from a concern to protect male pride in 
concealing male infertility.201  English judges and some academics began to 
view the revelation of genetic truths as benefiting the welfare of the child,202 
and, increasingly, knowing the truth came to be perceived “as (almost) 
unequivocally good for children.”203  Over time, this welfare standard was 
attached to a rights-based claim—that children had a right to know their 
                                                                                                                   
 197 Dempsey, supra note 196. 
 198 Id. at 81–82 (noting that the premise that a child’s sense of identity is linked to 
understanding its biological origins “informs infertility treatment policy [in the Australian 
state of] Victoria . . .  [where donors] must agree to enter their name and contact details in a 
register, in order that any offspring so desiring can have access to this information in the 
future”); see Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) pt 7 (detailing the requirements of record 
keeping in cases of donor conception).  
 199 BLAUWHOFF, supra note 12, at 403–04. 
 200 Family Law Reform Act, 1969, c. 46, § 21(3)(b).   
 201 Melanie Roberts, Children By Donation: Do They Have A Claim to Their Genetic 
Parentage?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD LAW 47, 53–54 (Jo Bridgeman & Daniel 
Monk eds., 2000).  
 202 Smart, supra note 30, at 398; Compare Re H and A (Paternity: Blood Tests) [2002] 
EWCA (Civ) 383, [2002] 1 F.L.R. 1145, [29], with Re F (A Minor) (Blood Tests: Paternity 
Rights) [1993] Fam. 314 (ruling that since the applicant’s association with the mother had 
ceased before the birth of the child, parental responsibility or contact orders were unlikely to 
be made and an order for blood tests would achieve no more than a theoretical declaration of 
paternity, the benefit of which would be outweighed by the risk of disruption to the child’s 
family unit as a result of such tests).  
 203 Smart, supra note 30, at 398. 
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genetic origins.204  Many felt this recognition of children’s rights was 
necessary as it gave children protection against adult distortions of the truth 
and offered children significant legal rights in relation to their parents in 
these difficult cases.205  
The rights-based argument is not based on subjective and changing 
normative values on the child’s welfare, but on a universal claim to justice 
for every generation through aligning legal and “physical” truth.206  The 
argument claims to defend children’s rights against nondisclosure and “webs 
of deceit,” and, at least at first, it seems that this argument is uncontestable: 
children would be treated unjustly if they were not permitted to know the 
truth of their genetic origins.207  
In England, the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 further influenced 
the law in favor of the right to know under Article 8.208  Previously, in 1984, 
the Commission of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
chaired by Baroness Warnock, recommended that donor-conceived children 
be deemed legitimate and that donors have no parental rights or duties.209  
Although the Warnock Committee was concerned about the secrecy 
surrounding donor children’s conception, donor anonymity was still 
entrenched in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.210  Under 
the Act, if a woman is married at the time of the artificial insemination of 
sperm, even if the resulting embryo was not created using the sperm of her 
husband, the husband is treated as the father of the child, unless he shows 
that he did not consent to the insemination.211  Thus, the common law 
presumption of legitimacy applies even in the absence of consent, and the 
child will be regarded as the legitimate child of the mother’s husband unless 
refuted.212  However, in Rose v. Secretary of State for Health, the court 
upheld the claims of a donor-conceived woman to knowledge regarding the 
identity of her father.213  These arguments would ultimately influence the 
heated debates that led to legislation ending the anonymity of men who 
donate sperm to fertility clinics in England.214  
                                                                                                                   
 204 Id. at 399.  
 205 Id. 
 206 Smart, supra note 96, at 553. 
 207 Id. at 554. 
 208 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
 209 DHSS REPORT, supra note 149, at 4.17. 
 210 HFEA 1990, supra note 98, § 28. 
 211 Id. § 28(2).   
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 213 [2002] EWHC (Admin) 1593, [2002] 2 F.L.R. 692, [47]. 
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2.  Disclosure of Identity by Lesbian Couples to Their Donor-Inseminated 
Children  
Lesbian couples are deliberately establishing families without men as 
partners or fathers,215 and to date there is no conclusive evidence that 
children raised by lesbian parents from birth suffer developmental or 
emotional problems in the absence of conventional fathers.216  Many lesbian 
couples aspire to a version of family in which two equally co-parenting 
mothers demonstrate that they have their child’s best interests at heart by not 
making an irreversible decision about donor anonymity on behalf of that 
child and also by allowing the formation of a “donor relationship.”217  
Problematically, the biological father may perceive sperm contribution as the 
means to form a relationship with a child, not solely contingent, as was 
apparent for the co-parent and the mother, on fulfilling the demands of 
“children’s right to know.”218 
In England, the House of Lords has found the biological mother’s 
contribution as the genetic, gestational, and psychological mother to be 
unique from that of her lesbian partner, and has denied the lesbian partner the 
status of primary caretaker.219  Despite lacking full recognition as the child’s 
parent, legislatively, the position of the lesbian partner has been improved in 
England.  If, prior to the child’s birth, the lesbian partner becomes the 
biological mother’s civil partner, she can apply for a Parental Responsibility 
Order recognizing her as the child’s stepparent.220  Alternatively, if the 
services of licensed clinics are used to conceive, then the lesbian partner is 
                                                                                                                   
chaired the 1984 Committee of Inquiry into Fertilisation and Embryology, stated that she now 
supported the view that donor-conceived persons should have the same “right to know” as 
adopted people.  Call to End Sperm Donor Anonymity, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2002), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/1986683.stm.  She based her argument on the greater awareness 
and increasing sensitivity to genetic inheritance.  Jess Buxton, Should Egg and Sperm Donors 
Remain Anonymous?, BIONEWS (May 20, 2002), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_37624. 
asp.  This issue of donor anonymity was one of the most controversial in the parliamentary 
debates leading to the removal of donor anonymity.  DEP’T OF HEALTH, DONOR INFORMATION 
CONSULTATION: PROVIDING INFORMATION ABOUT GAMETE OR EMBRYO DONORS para. 1.15 
(2001), reprinted in 5 HUM. FERTILITY 97 (2002). 
 215 Kathryn Almack, Seeking Sperm: Accounts of Lesbian Couples’ Reproductive Decision-
Making and Understandings of the Needs of the Child, 20 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 1, 8 
(2006). 
 216 Smith, supra note 9, at 237. 
 217 Id.  The mother may assume that having lesbian parents automatically excludes a child 
from the right to have contact with his or her biological father.  Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Re G (Children) (Residence: Same Sex Partner), [2006] UKHL 43, [2006] 4 All E.R. 241. 
 220 Children Act, 1989, c. 41, § 3(1) (U.K.). 
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normally treated as the child’s legal parent, whether or not the two women 
have become civil partners.221  In cases where the biological mother’s lesbian 
partner is treated as a legal parent, the sperm donor is barred from applying 
for a Parental Responsibility Order.222  However, if a sperm donor donates 
sperm to a lesbian couple under an informal arrangement not involving a 
licensed clinic, the sperm donor may be able to obtain a Parental 
Responsibility Order.223  In some cases the courts have refused to grant him 
parental responsibility on the grounds that he would undermine the 
autonomy of the lesbian family unit,224 which often has concepts of 
“mother,” “father,” “parent,” and “donor” that challenge legal definitions.225  
More often, however, lesbian couples are legally vulnerable and, therefore, 
do not have the ability to determine the biological father’s rights to a legal 
relationship with his child or the extent of the donor father’s inclusion in the 
family unit with the children and their “mothers.”226 
Although most lesbian couples do not intend for a known donor to have a 
parental relationship with the donor-conceived child since they regard 
themselves as parents, they acknowledge the child’s right to know the 
identity of his biological father.227  Unlike heterosexual couples utilizing 
artificial insemination, lesbian couples do not face male infertility and the 
resulting reluctance to discuss issues associated with it.  Also, unlike 
heterosexual couples that can hide the fact that a donor child is not 
genetically related to his father, lesbian couples will eventually have to 
answer their children’s questions about the absence of a male parent.  Thus, 
                                                                                                                   
 221 HFEA 2008, supra note 98, § 43.  
 222 Id. § 54(1).  Under the Child Support Act 1991, donors may also be liable for 
maintenance for any children born as a result of a known donor arrangement.  Almack, supra 
note 215, at 5. 
 223 Re D (Contact and Parental Responsibility: Lesbian Mother and Known Father), [2006] 
EWHC (Fam) 2, [2006] 1 F.C.R. 556, [93]. 
 224 Re B (Role of Biological Father), [2007] EWHC (Fam) 1952, [2008] 1 F.L.R. 1015.  
 225 See Almack, supra note 215, at 11–13 (listing descriptions of family used by lesbians 
who have conceived through donor conception).  
 226 See Re Patrick (An Application Concerning Contract) [2002] 28 Fam LR 579 (Austl.).  
This case was the first time an Australian court was required to give judgment on the kinship 
status of a child of a homosexual who had contributed his sperm to a lesbian biological mother 
by donor insemination outside a clinical setting.  Dempsey, supra note 196, at 78.  It is 
apparent that lesbian and homosexuals may have very different concepts of such a 
relationship.  Id.  The father could not conceive of himself as a “known donor” but only as a 
father.  Id. at 88. 
 227 Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman’s Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call 
for an Expanded Definition of Family 4 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 33 (1981) (noting that 
artificial insemination gives lesbian women a chance to have a child without involving a man, 
and an opportunity to raise the child with a partner in a unit of two ‘parents’). 
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among lesbian parents, rates of disclosure to their children, or plans to 
disclose, tend to be almost 100%.228  Thus, regarding disclosures, donor 
children of lesbian couples are arguably unfairly advantaged in relation to 
children born to heterosexual parents who are unlikely to have a social 
trigger obviating disclosure.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is undoubtedly a growing trend toward openness in the field of 
gamete donation.  Arguments are already being formulated that children not 
only should know about donor kin, but also should have relationships with 
them on the basis of the analogy of adoption.229  There are also websites that 
make it possible for children born from sperm donation to learn the identity 
of their genetic or donor parents.230  Even in cases of anonymous donation it 
is becoming possible for curious older children to discover the identity of a 
donor parent.231 
Fundamentally, it is arguable that the right to know underlies the principle 
of decisional privacy, which is the basis of the right to private life.232  
                                                                                                                   
 228 J.E. Sheib et al., Choosing Identity-Release Sperm Donors: The Parents’ Perspective 13–
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and online search engines.  The donor concerned had contracted with the fertility clinic to 
remain anonymous.  The teenager had very little access to information, except the date and 
place of the man’s birth, but took a swab of the inside of his cheek and mailed it to an online 
genealogy DNA-testing service.  Having acquired the date and place of the donor’s birth, the 
teenager managed to trace his biological father.  Id. 
 232 See Mikulic v. Croatia, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 54 (“The Court has held that respect 
for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as 
individual human beings and that an individual’s entitlement to such information is of 
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Biological parentage may be considered one aspect of a person’s fixed 
identity and an immutable quality.  The notion of decisional privacy suggests 
that people should, in principle, have free choice when interpreting their 
fixed identity—a right to informational self-determination.  Arguably, the 
existence of the right to know is not a matter based on concern for individual 
emotional welfare, because there is not enough evidence available as to 
whether it conduces to an individual’s welfare to have such knowledge.  
Instead, the concept is based on the proposition that no one has the right to 
decide on another person’s behalf whether that other person should or should 
not be able to know about their own genetic history.233  Even if this 
informational self-determination is considered to be partially socially 
constructed and only pressing as a result of the adoption movement and bio-
medical developments it defies historical interpretation and is immutable.  
However, arguments opposing the blanket assertion of such a right take 
into account the majority of donor conception cases, in which there is a 
social father and a recognized family unit that appears, in the case of the 
heterosexual family, to be otherwise “normal,” stable, and ready to embrace 
a much-longed-for child.  Such families are anxious not to disturb that 
stability.  They also argue that the donor-conceived child’s right to know in 
such cases conflicts with the rights to autonomy and privacy of the mother, 
the “social” father, and the gamete donor.  In this sphere, placing greater 
pressure on social parents via a legal responsibility to disclose a donor-
conceived child’s biological origins could constitute not only an invasion of 
the parents’ privacy rights, but also a moralizing circumstance entirely 
insensitive to the parents’ situation at the time of conception, especially in 
view of the fact that the parents may risk social ostracism in some societies if 
they disclose the information surrounding their child’s birth.  
It may be difficult for a donor-conceived child to conceptualize a genetic 
donor purely in terms of biological inheritance and not as a social father.234  
Conversely, a biological father who enters the donor-conceived child’s life 
may have more than merely a psychological role; instead their biological 
connection may, and perhaps should, become a factor in donor–child 
relationships that arise.  Ultimately, more research is needed before firm 
conclusions can be made about the role of fathers in such donor-conceived 
families.   
                                                                                                                   
importance because of its formative implications for his or her personality.”). 
 233 Memorandum by David Gollancz (Ev 44), in JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE HUMAN TISSUE 
AND EMBRYOS (DRAFT) BILL, VOLUME II: EVIDENCE, 2006–7, H.L. 169-II, at 366 (U.K.). 
 234 Grace et al., supra note 114, at 312. 
660  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:619 
 
Infertility success rates continue to rise as medical technologies 
advance.235  Donor-conceived children enrich the lives of many who would 
have been infertile in another era, giving such parents the opportunity to raise 
much-desired children who are genetically related to one parent.  But this 
opportunity is threatened by the removal of anonymity.  For example, the 
removal of donor anonymity in England has caused some frustration and 
despair.236  There is a possibility that fewer children will be conceived if 
social parents become hesitant about using this method of conception and the 
pool of regulated sperm donors diminishes for fear of lost privacy.237  
Given the fact that the CRC was not drafted with sperm donation in mind, 
there is no clear answer in regard to the child’s right to know in the donor 
conception context.238  It is suggested that legislation mandating disclosure 
of donor status is not the solution, but rather a balancing test should be 
formulated involving all competing interests.239  Ultimately, a holistic 
approach that takes into account the best interests of the entire family, rather 
than narrowly focusing on fulfilling the rights of donor-conceived children to 
access information about the identity of their biological fathers is required.  
Such a narrow focus may not benefit any of the parties in the long run.240  A 
holistic approach would take account of the psychological complexities of 
donor conception, as well as the fact that mandatory donor identification 
statutes do not lead immediately to greater disclosure by parents, but rather 
to dramatic dips in sperm supplies leading to the escalation of undesirable 
“reproductive tourism.”241  
It is therefore suggested that a gradual process which gently nudges the 
process toward greater transparency is more desirable in this area.  The 
movement toward greater openness would be facilitated by the removal of 
the stigma of infertility and a greater sensitivity by donor parents to the needs 
of their offspring.  This will bring about disclosure conducive to the welfare 
of children and the stability of all families involved.  The blunt instrument of 
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legislative enforcement requiring disclosure of genetic origins of donor-
conceived persons is not recommended in this area nor is it necessitated by 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights or a careful 
interpretation of the CRC. 
